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Lecture “EU as a Global Player: Reality or Illusion?”

London, 23.11.2010  |  speech


Lecture by Dr Danilo Türk, President of the Republic of Slovenia, at the London School of Economics and Political Science: “EU as a Global Player: Reality or Illusion?”
London, 23 November 2010


President Dr Danilo Türk visited the London School of Economics and Political Science, where he gave a lecture entitled “EU as a Global Player: Reality or Illusion?” (Photo: Stanko Gruden/STA)I

Thank you, Professor Chalmers, for your very warm welcome and very friendly introduction. You were clearly right when you talked about Ljubljana and Slovenia and about the qualities of the Law Faculty in Ljubljana, although I must say that the achievements at that time had nothing to do with my work, because I was then working in New York as the Slovenian Ambassador to the United Nations. However, I’m very glad to accept on its behalf the kind words that you addressed to the Law Faculty of Ljubljana, which is really a great school and I would advise you to make use of the facilities of various programmes of the European Union, including the Erasmus/Socrates Programme, which allows young people to travel to other places and to do a semester in a university other than their own.

I’m very happy to be here tonight and very pleased to see among you quite a few friends from earlier days. I’m particularly pleased to see my daughter, Helena, who’s always a very critical listener and I can assure you that that gives me a sense of trepidation as I start. I’ll hopefully recover as I proceed and I look forward to your questions and comments because, as a former academic, I particularly enjoy meeting people in an academic environment such as this. I’m sure that many questions occur in relation to the title of my talk: Is the notion of the European Union as a global player a reality or an illusion or how does the future of the European Union as a global player look?

These are obviously very serious, very difficult questions, which have been with us for a long time and I can only take a rather limited view in the thirty minutes that is available for a basic definition of an approach to the problem. My approach is this: In the last decade, and earlier, the European Union has lived in what could be called “a phase of institutional optimism”. Institutional optimism has, of course, always been there with the European Union but that optimism was particularly high at the time of preparation of the Lisbon Treaty. The belief that things happen as a result of norms and institutions was very strong. Indeed, that also extended to the idea that the strengthened institutions and norms of the European Union would in some way automatically establish a meaningful global role for the organisation.

On the other hand, it was also noted that another set of activities of the European Union related to what was called the Lisbon Strategy, a document that was adopted several years earlier concerning economic and social development of the area, had not been successful. What happened was a kind of a dichotomy or perhaps even a contradiction – an institutionally optimistic approach simultaneous with an experience that was not particularly optimistic in terms of how the European Union could improve its competitiveness, how it could ensure its social cohesion and make itself a leading power of world development.

This was the situation until recently. The current situation is characterised by another set of problems, arising from the present financial crisis, which have revealed the weaknesses of the EU as a project. They have also shown that the size of the EU economy alone, and the fact that it continues to be the largest donor in international development assistance, do not in themselves produce a key role in international affairs. That became particularly apparent at the time of the Copenhagen Conference. The vulnerabilities of the European Union became clearer than they were before.

This has given rise to a certain amount of pessimism at home, in the European Union and rather critical views outside the European Union. Critical views sometimes amount to a dismissive attitude, which is actually quite fashionable though not necessarily thought through outside the European Union at present.

So we are faced with a psychological situation which calls for a very careful assessment. In such an assessment, it is important to remind ourselves that the European Union is constructed on the very solid foundation of shared values, such as peace, liberty, solidarity and the market economy; great values, which have brought stability, an unprecedented level of stability, to the European continent and which continue to be a source of hope and promise for the future.

The basis exists. However, in talking about the need to develop the European Union into a global player, the question arises as to what are the priority tasks, what would make the European Union into such a player? I believe – and this is my proposal for discussion tonight is – that there are three essential requirements that must be met.

The first is the need to deal successfully with the current euro crisis. The European Union must demonstrate its effectiveness in crisis management if it wishes to preserve and further develop the European economic and social model and the credibility that it needs at the international level to become effective as an international player.

Secondly, and very importantly, the European Union must develop a clearer sense of hierarchy among its geopolitical priorities, and a more coherent foreign and security policy. There are contours of such a common foreign and security policy. However, they do not yet represent a fully-fledged policy and there is scope for debate about what the priorities should be and how those priorities should be achieved.

The third, also quite important aspect, is that the European Union needs to develop a realistic and honest policy on human rights, both at home and internationally. It must strengthen its own social basis and exert its moral influence internationally. I deliberately avoid the terminology of “soft power”. Instead, I am speaking about the moral influence that the European Union has exerted in the past, is exerting at present and should exert in the future. For that to be a reality, though, the human rights policy must become more sophisticated.

These are my three proposals. They are somewhat arbitrarily chosen, as is any hypothesis, and there are clearly other possible ways of approaching the problem. I would be glad to hear your views. First, however, let me say a few words about each of these three areas, these three requirements, which must be met if the European Union is to develop a meaningful global role at present.

President Dr Danilo Türk visited the London School of Economics and Political Science, where he gave a lecture entitled “EU as a Global Player: Reality or Illusion?” (Photo: Stanko Gruden/STA)II

First, the financial crisis of 2010 has revealed the weaknesses of the Union and shows that the monetary and fiscal framework of the European monetary union is incomplete. The rules based framework of fiscal policy created by the Excessive Deficit Procedure and, above all, by the Stability and Growth Pact, was insufficient to prevent the current debt crisis, despite its stringent rules – demanding low budget deficits and budgetary planning. It should also be borne in mind that those rules were violated in the past by some of the key members of the European Union and that, of course, diminished the authority of those rules and of the whole system.

Following the financial crisis in Greece, the EU established the European Financial Stability Facility, which amounts in total, including the part provided by the International Monetary Fund, to 750 billion euro. This financial stability facility is now being put to the test in dealing with the current financial crisis in Ireland. It can provide, and I believe will provide, the necessary liquidity, which is part of negotiations that are taking place right now. The question of external debt of that country and the matter of the insolvency of the banks require a wider package, which will take some time to work out and policy measures need to be put in place. They will probably have to include the IMF, private banks and other actors and the question of debt restructuring is likely to continue to be discussed. I cannot say much more about this, simply because I don’t know exactly how the negotiations are going. However, one can clearly see the immediate tasks, which relate to the question of liquidity and dealing with the current situation and, secondly, the deeper question of the size and nature of the debt involved. Hence, the need for the variety of actors that must be put in the picture if the problem is to be resolved definitively.

This is the current crisis situation. The European Union is aware that there is a need for a more permanent mechanism and, therefore, as you all know, on 29 October this year the European Council decided to establish what was called “a permanent crisis mechanism to safeguard the financial stability of the euro area as a whole and to invite the President of the European Council to undertake consultations with members of the European Council on a limited treaty change required to that effect”.

The legal problems of that approach should not be underestimated. The Lisbon Treaty will have to undergo what was termed in that decision, and I quote, “a limited treaty change”. Let us think about this terminology, “a limited treaty change.” What exactly does it mean? Is this another example of legal camouflage, which is sometimes so helpful in EU matters? How will this affect the authority of the Lisbon Treaty? As a professor of international law, I’m always worried when I see treaties being changed so soon after they enter into force. An early change inevitably has an adverse effect on their authority.

The substantive problem is deeper and more complex. What will constitute this permanent crisis resolution mechanism? How would such a system work? Who would initiate the process: the European Commission, somebody else, a new organ of the EU perhaps? Which organ should conduct negotiations between the debtor country and creditors? Should the European Financial Stability Facility, which is now in place until 2013, become permanent under the new system. One might say that it should become permanent, that’s the whole idea – but what should be its purpose? Should it be primarily addressing the issues of liquidity or should it also be there to deal with questions of the insolvency of debtor states? That will have to be clarified and I wonder whether such a clarification will be forthcoming before the end of this year, when another round of discussions on this subject is planned.

Another major legal policy and strategic question is the role of the International Monetary Fund in this system. Given its resources and experience, the International Monetary Fund is useful in such situations. It has been useful in the Greek situation, in the current situation concerning Ireland and that it will probably also have to be kept in the picture for the permanent crisis resolution mechanism. How that would work and what role it would have is something to be discussed further.

The introduction of the European Crisis Resolution Mechanism is essential if we wish to establish the necessary degree of financial stability in the euro area and, through it, the necessary credibility of the European Union. One sometimes has to think about problems that loom on the horizon, which are not yet fully developed in the current discussions, but must be given some attention.

I wonder if any of you has been thinking about writing a thesis on the question of turning the European Monetary Union into a fully-fledged fiscal union. What kind of tasks would that entail in the economic aspect, what would be the tasks in terms of legal regulation? Is this at all feasible? The current discussions have naturally led to references of a fiscal union and there are many who would say that it’s a necessary line of development for the future. Some would even say that the amounts needed for the establishment of such a system would not necessarily be very large. The question of financial resources, though, is only one of the questions. There are much more sensitive questions beyond that and I don’t wish to speculate on where the development will go.

However, the seriousness of the problem has clearly to be recognised because it is quite conceivable that unless the system integrates further, it may in fact come to a split of the European Union, or even the Eurozone area, into two parts: those who need credit for overcoming their financial difficulties and those who are constantly being asked to supply the funds.

You can well imagine that this is an extremely sensitive political matter for a country like Slovenia. We have been confronted with this kind of donor role for the second time in a short period and it hasn’t been easy politically. Slovenia joined the Eurozone and the Schengen area in 2007. Since then people have accepted the euro as their currency; nobody is thinking about alternatives. Nevertheless, when we are told to demonstrate solidarity with regard to situations resulting from financial practices and economic behaviour that could be described as problematic, then you can clearly imagine the political difficulties that arise. I’m sure that these discussions are taking place everywhere in Europe. Slovenia is a country that doesn’t require any assistance, that has a fairly good set of figures in terms of public debt and budget deficit and takes these questions very seriously.

I would like to mention that, although the EU is facing a difficult situation, it is also one that is not entirely new in its nature. The European Community was able earlier on to turn crisis into opportunities. The “euro sclerosis of 1980s” is an example and it was a precursor to the Single European Act, adopted in 1986. I remember as a professor at the time, how powerful a mobilising effect that change produced. First, there was a lot of talk about “euro sclerosis” and euroscepticism. Then things changed as a result of adoption of the Single European Act and, all of a sudden, I got a number of requests from students to study European Union law because the credibility of the system had improved dramatically and practically overnight.

Whether the EU will be able to turn things round in a similar manner today is an interesting question. I’m not suggesting that I know the answer. I’m not suggesting that this is even likely, but I retain a certain residual optimism in that regard and I hope that something positive will happen in the months to come.

Let us take an optimistic view of these things and recall that, in addition to dealing with the most immediate questions of financial stability, there are other important tasks ahead of the European Union if it wishes to strengthen its internal cohesion and be effective internationally.

One – we should not forget – is the completion of the single market. Mario Monti produced an interesting report earlier this year, in which he described the tasks in that regard. The single market has been established but there are tasks that remain, including the movement of people within the European Union. Such tasks do not seem to be among the main priorities at present but when things move forward, then these issues will return to the fore. The question of how to improve competitiveness and, at the same time, to retain or even improve social cohesion, will also be among them.

All this constitutes the agenda for strengthening the European Union as an economic and social system, an economic and financial system. The strength of the system is a fundamental requirement for its global role. You can see that this requirement is far from being met. The European Union must put its house in order if it wishes to play an active and meaningful global role.

III

Let me briefly address another requirement: a coherent foreign and security policy. The hypothesis is that a coherent foreign policy is a sine qua non for a meaningful global role. We must be aware that this coherence is not easy to establish. The European Union is not a nation state. The German Constitutional Court reminded us of that in its pronouncement in June last year, very clearly and in a very detailed fashion. We have to be aware that creating a common EU policy is something that takes time and effort.

The creation of the External Service, which has consumed a great deal of energy this year, is necessary but the question is whether it is decisive. I’m not sure about it. The European Union must do two things. It must improve its institutional system but, above all, it must define the hierarchy among its foreign policy priorities. These two tasks might look a little like the chicken and egg dilemma; what comes first? Can institutions like an external service be expected to be put to good use if the priorities are not set clearly? Alternatively, could one say that it is possible for the foreign service to help in articulating priorities with greater clarity and, therefore, isn’t it timely to focus on that task? Be that as it may, I believe that although it’s wise to have an improved external service, it’s even more important to have clear priorities.

What should those priorities be? Le me make three suggestions, which I hope will generate some interest and possibly discussion. The first foreign policy priority should be partnership and cooperation with the countries of the Eastern Partnership and the Russian Federation. The second priority should be the expansion or enlargement of EU membership with the Balkan countries and Turkey. The third should be visa liberalization.

This may look a little odd, given the whole range of issues that the European Union is addressing and the variety of priorities that are normally proposed in the literature. There is very good reason for the European Union to look eastwards, towards the Ukraine, towards Russia, towards countries of the Eastern Partnership.

A. J. P. Taylor, a famous British historian, who wrote a great book about the Habsburg monarchy, described in the book’s final chapter what the future should look like. He says that the solution to the problem of Europe is to move industrial power from the West to the Centre and the East. He was right. Much of that programme has already been completed. The eastward expansion of the European Union has been a major success, it has brought additional power, prosperity, freedom to Europe and it should continue.

There are also valid economic reasons for it. Russia is fairly open today. Russia is interested in modernisation. Modernisation is taken seriously. It is a serious opportunity for the European Union. Modernisation does not just mean technological improvement. It also means changes in the legal structure and improvement in the legal system, which is necessary for further strengthening the economic and social prosperity of the country. All that is understood. I must say I am among those who believe that President Medvedev, who has been in the forefront of these activities, is serious and honest in this effort and that there are many followers.

There are, of course, economic reasons such as energy, a need to establish a better link between the European Union and Russia in order to establish energy security, as well as security in the narrower sense of the word. We have seen the recent developments in the NATO-Russia partnership, which demonstrate that the level of confidence has been growing. We don’t know whether it will last, whether there will be setbacks, but it is very positive that NATO and Russia have reached the point at which they are today.

It is also clear that all the positive developments that can happen in the field of security, in the narrow definition, must be underpinned by a stronger basis of cooperation through a fabric of economic cooperation that only the European Union can provide. So I think that there are also very good security reasons to complement what is being achieved in NATO-Russia relations, with Russia-EU relations.

That merely sketches out priority number one. That priority has to include Ukraine. Ukraine obviously deserves a European perspective. That must be there and other countries of Eastern Partnership must also be addressed in a manner that serves their legitimate interests, as well as those of the European Union.

The second priority relates to the Western Balkans. The programme of enlargement is fairly well defined here. It is clear what these countries must do. The European Union must make sure that the European perspective remains real. The countries in question must be absolutely clear in their understanding that fulfilment of membership criteria is essential. There is no shortcut. There is no way of circumventing the membership criteria and that includes cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia in every detail. I say this because this element is sometime rather blurred in the wider discussion, which is permeated with good will and good intentions. This is fine, but it must be quite clear that full cooperation with the ICTY, including the apprehension of General Mladić and handing him over to ICTY for trial must be part of the membership criteria.

Turkey has been waiting for serious negotiations for too long. There are obstacles to fulfilment of the membership criteria. The obstacles are there, they are real, but they must not be allowed to serve as an excuse for immobility or even as a cover for prejudice. This distinction is important but the European Union does not always make it with sufficient clarity and I would like to use this opportunity tonight to make this very clear. Turkey is a major strategic and economic asset for the European Union and there is no valid, logical reason against its further progress towards membership. Turkey’s membership in the EU will not happen overnight. Fulfilling the criteria is a requirement there, too, but there should be no excuse for immobility, let alone for cultural or other prejudice.

Finally, on visa liberalization. I believe that we must think about visa liberalization in new ways. So far the countries of the European Union have gone through different types of experience. One of them, affecting Slovenia, for example, was entering the Schengen area. I must say that it is sometimes very painful for people travelling to countries in the Schengen area. I was a professor at the time that Schengen was introduced and it coincided with an arrangement that I was making with a doctoral candidate from Macedonia, with whom I was in contact by email. At one point I wanted to invite her to Ljubljana for consultations. The timing coincided with the introduction of the Schengen regime in August 2006. I had spare time that month, so I concentrated on the Schengen procedures and finally compiled a file, which almost looked like a peace treaty, all necessary merely for the young lady to be allowed to come to Ljubljana for consultations. I’m exaggerating, but only slightly.

Freedom of movement is a human right. That freedom includes the right to leave one’s own country and to return to one’s own country, but it doesn’t include the right to enter foreign country. However, liberalization of movement is in the interest of human rights and has to be seen in that light. There are obviously problems but these problems must be addressed in a targeted manner, not with a generalized regime that prevents people from communicating. There are thousands of students, journalists, normal people, who want to travel more freely. Europe must do more to make that happen. We need a broader human base for cooperation with the Eastern Europe that remains outside the frontiers of the European Union. We should not be afraid. We should make this happen because that human base would allow us to develop the kind of cooperation needed for the future strengthening of the European Union.

IV

I have already started to talk about human rights. Freedom of movement is a human right. However, let me conclude with a few remarks on human rights as a fundamental value for the European Union and as a fundamental element of its foreign policy and global role. The European Union is clearly based on the principle of human rights and is defined as a system that promotes human rights and fundamental freedom. Much has been achieved and the European Union is currently preparing to become a party to the European Convention on Human Rights, something that those of you who are studying law and human rights could usefully analyse and see how one makes it happen.

The agenda of human rights at home has to be approached with great sensitivity. European Union politicians and other public figures sometimes take the view that human rights are already guaranteed, that there is not much to do, that we are actually dealing merely with policy issues, which allow for a high lever of discretion, and that things are generally fine. I think, though, that the whole question of immigration, treatment of immigrant communities and individual immigrants is much more complex, much more sensitive and in need of a more sophisticated policy approach.

In approaching the task, there are certain aspects that seem clear enough. Again, I think that we have to have a clear sense of hierarchy in dealing with all the kinds of ethnic diversity that have resulted from recent immigration. That’s obviously a challenge in Europe. The hierarchy should be such that nothing that is done or enacted should be in contradiction with the basic tenets of human rights. Respect for human rights, respect for the rights of the individual is a basic requirement.

Respect for cultural diversity, on the other hand, has its limits. Cultural identities, cultural traditions, must conform to the requirements of human rights. I think we have to be very clear on that and we have to find practical expressions of that hierarchy with great clarity. Culture cannot be used as a justification for the violation of human rights of any kind. We must think about the term “violations of human rights” in this context. There has to be a hierarchy, as I said, between the human rights of individuals and the norms of traditional culture and, in such situations, human rights must prevail. The legal order of the country must be respected and the customs of different ethnic, religious or other communities or immigrant groups must be adjusted to it.

This is a sense of hierarchy though, of course, not yet policy. What, then, should be the elements of a policy addressing the questions of ethnic diversity resulting from recent or current migration. Let me suggest a few key elements in a fairly abstract way. I believe the first requirement is that, where applicable, linguistic integration of immigrants is a critically important basis for successful social integration in general. I don’t think that we pay enough attention to this question, to the linguistic side of it. We must do more.

Second, access to healthcare and, especially, to quality education is another key ingredient, something that is crucial to upward social mobility; and upward social mobility is the only way of handling the questions of ethnic diversity resulting from recent and current migration. This, again, is simple enough to say. It sounds easy. It’s much harder to develop such simple propositions into a comprehensive meaningful policy. We have to be clear about the basic ideas, though, including the basic idea of the importance of linguistic integration, the importance of real opportunities for high quality education and, as a result, the opportunity for upward social mobility. These are the ingredients that we have to develop further into fully-fledged policy.

So much for the agenda of domestic activities, or activities within the European Union in an area of human rights, which is the obvious priority today. Let me say a word or two about the international field or the global agenda. I think that here we need serious reflection and to build on the successes of past decades. I see some of my human rights friends in this room with whom I discussed the human rights problems of the 1970s and 80s. Let us just recall how the world looked then: dictatorships in Latin America, communist rule in Eastern Europe, dictatorships in Asia and Africa.

Things have changed, the world has improved. Of course there are still situations that reveal consistent patterns of gross violations of human rights. Yes, there are; but there are much fewer than in the past. The world has achieved a significant improvement. I believe that we must learn to build on these successes and be aware of the complexity of implementation of human rights in situations in which development, i.e. lifting people out of extreme poverty, is the overarching priority for many governments. The European Union must find a finely tuned policy approach that would make its proposals acceptable and meaningful at the international level.

We should be worried by the fact that, at the UN today, over 60% of the UN members regularly vote against European Union proposals on human rights. We have a problem there and I would suggest reflection, starting from the fact that much has been achieved but that as a result we have a more complex and more demanding agenda to deal with today. This agenda has much to do with development and has to include recognition of progress where progress is real.

Let me just take one example. In the late 1990s, Indonesia looked like a country in which one military rule would be replaced by another. It did not happen. What happened was a succession of presidents of the country, each of whom brought something new and something positive. I’m not suggesting that the situation in that large, complex country is ideal but it is certainly much better than it was fifteen years ago and it is promising. How, then, does the European Union cooperate with a large and successful country like that? How does it use the positive experience of the past for the benefit of that country and other countries for the future. I could quote other examples. I don’t want to be excessively optimistic but it needs to be emphasised that the EU needs a more nuanced, more sophisticated approach in that regard. The European Union will otherwise be faced with unnecessary and unproductive differences of opinion and conflicts of views.

The European Union must also get rid of some bad habits that it has acquired over time. It must avoid being perceived as lecturing or moralising, it should refrain from vituperative statements, attempting to impose solutions. I’m not suggesting that the EU is actually doing all that but such impressions are sometimes created and, as you know, impressions in politics are very often more important than facts. EU has work to do here, the importance of which should not be underestimated. It is necessary fully to appreciate the magnitude, the importance of that task for the European Union, because the European Union is not going to achieve an effective global role through military means or through exercise of other elements of power. It can, though, do much with its economic power, with its example of success, by leadership, by example and by offering sophisticated, meaningful policy responses to the challenges of development that nowadays characterise most of the world.

We have some mechanisms, which are still very weak and which shouldn’t be overestimated but they are there. The Universal Periodic Review of the United Nations Human Rights Council is a useful mechanism. I know that it’s often criticised and many people are disappointed with it, but it is a useful beginning, something on which to build. There will be need for new instruments to be developed in the future. You are the generation that will have the great advantage of developing those new instruments. We have done a lot of work on international treaties and implementation mechanisms, which have achieved good results. It’s only a partial achievement, though. Much more needs to be done. Policy-making, which strengthens human rights in the process of development and reduction of poverty, will be needed.

Let me conclude. First of all, the European Union must put its house in order, then it must set its foreign policy priorities with a better and stronger sense of hierarchy and it must make key areas of its policy-making, such as human rights, more sophisticated.

That, in a nutshell, is the conclusion of my talk. The promise of a global role is certainly there. The promise is not illusionary. It is a very real opportunity. However, the European Union has to demonstrate its ability to turn a crisis into an opportunity. Leadership will be required. Leadership will have to come from Brussels institutions and, more importantly, from nation states. The European Union is not a state and it needs nation states to lead. Any discussion about the future of the European Union should include an expression of hope that such leadership will come and that, as a result, the crisis will be turned into an opportunity and that the European Union will progress. Thank you very much.
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