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THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE - SYMBOL OF THE EUROPE WE DESIRE
SESSION OF THE PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE
Speech by the President of the Republic of Slovenia, Milan Kucan
Strasbourg (France), 26 January 1999
"In South-Eastern Europe and in part of the Balkans the processes of Europeanisation and democratisation are stalling. I do not wish in any way to denigrate the efforts of the OSCE, the EU, NATO and in particular the direct involvement of the USA in this crisis area, especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, yet it still seems that we are dealing with a vicious circle and that we are waiting helplessly for this circle to stop of its own accord. But it will not.
Yet again we need to think, without reservation or indulgence, about the causes of the war in Croatia, against Bosnia and in Kosovo. These wars were not caused or triggered by ethnic differences or by allegiance to different religions, as some would still have us believe today; for example, Serbian policy as the herald of the Orthodox Christian community is being raised to the level of defender against the purported aggression of Islamic fundamentalism. These wars were started and are being conducted by undemocratic, nationalist political elites from coexisting nations. By fanning the flames of political passions and the use of marginal groups from the social and political underground for military killings, they have torn asunder the normal, common life in multiethnic and multicultural societies with long traditions of coexistence. The consistent punishing of war criminals and decisive measures to ensure respect of human rights could represent a new step which, in harmony with new development, primarily with an economic impetus, would return to this area true peace and a 'return' of what the people there knew as times of coexistence of diversity, tolerance and cooperation,..." president Kucan said and stressed that..
..."a solution should not be built on stereotypes of good and bad, or on the hypothesis that there will be eternally undemocratic regimes here. We should not overlook the differences between the long-term interests of these nations and the interests and current policies of their undemocratic elites. We should avoid demeaning nations."
Mr President, Secretary-General, honourable deputies,
This is the second time now in the eight-year history of the Slovenian state that I have had the opportunity to speak in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. The first time was one year after Slovenia became a member of the Council. On 21 September 1993 the members here passed a resolution on the crisis in Yugoslavia, calling on the member states of the Council of Europe to "consider the recognition of those (Yugoslav) republics which have declared independence". In this way the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe was the first international organisation to acknowledge our European, democratic orientation and even to help us towards being recognised, during the most difficult time for us of political and military clashes. Through this act the Council of Europe also proved that it is indeed the herald of the European idea of emerging from the past and into a more promising future.
I am especially honoured by this invitation, and I am very pleased to be here with you today, honourable deputies, for 1999 is a celebratory year for the Council of Europe. We will look back with great reverence to the fifth of May 1949, the day of founding for this pan-European institution and symbol of the Europe we desire. The decision of that time by ten European countries in London has in time been confirmed as a far-sighted act towards protecting and consolidating political democracy, the rule of law, respect of human rights, protection of the common European heritage and promoting economic and social progress across the European continent in all its diversity, multiplicity and plurality.
The fiftieth anniversary of the Council of Europe will therefore be much more than a conventional cause for remembering. This is also affirmed by the momentous events after 1989. The Council has grown into a construction of forty European countries which together wish to shape a democratic, stable and secure Europe, which should be governed by peace and the rule of human rights, and through cooperation to create a new developmental impetus.
Today there exist more or less clear interests, there are recognised expectations and there exist European values which are woven into the very fabric of the European idea. And are we now capable of linking all of this together to make the transition into the European future? To fulfil what seemed so long ago in London as removed far into the future, a political vision generated from tragic human experience? In Europe we have never before had such a good prospect of doing this. Europe has never been so close to being a safe common home of all nations and countries on our continent. Yet it will not be able to attain this goal if it cannot be united in seeking answers to common old and new questions. We are still beset with the remnants of undemocratic patterns. We still see living signs of aggressive nationalism, ideological fundamentalism and nationalist egoism, social oppression, and absence of political and spiritual freedom. We should not close our eyes to these things or regard them as marginal features. I would like to remind you of certain obstacles which I believe are worthy of consideration.
THE NEW IMAGE OF POSTSOCIALIST SOCIETIES
The process of change in postsocialist societies has, through its intensification after 1989, for the most part rendered these societies in their external image and institutional order comparable to the countries which have a long democratic tradition. And I can confirm this for Slovenia in all certainty. Yet the postsocialist countries have a varied past. Each one is in itself a living organism, which in its own way is responding to the changes. For this reason it is not possible to establish the level and speed of their transformation through mutual comparison, although this serves as a stimulant. Realistically, all we may learn is whether each in itself measures up to its citizens, whether it gives them the possibility of living in line with the standards which are valid for the Europe of today and tomorrow and to which the Council of Europe has ascribed the highest value. Such assessments will offer to each country and each nation sufficient space to create for themselves their very own modern identity, which they may with self-confidence and responsibility invest in the common European life, in the new Europe of diversity. For the new Europe, too, will live in diversity and division. Yet this will, I trust, be without those divisions that run counter to European values and ideas.
Postsocialist societies are experiencing difficulties in overcoming the historical gaps in their development. Changes in ownership and the market economy have brought about new social classes and new types of poverty. Social tensions and conflicts can provide fertile ground for various forms of nationalism, fundamentalism, egalitarianism, authoritarian political leadership and vulgar missionaries of elementary tribalism.
In the long term, the main problem in the development of these societies does not lie in the formal adaptation of their national law to that of Europe. The main problem is if these European laws remain merely an empty and ineffective programme of norms, instead of actively arranging relations in societies with varying recent histories and in this way integrating them truly into the common European society. This requires cooperation, solidarity and a mutuality in efforts seen as being in the common interest.
Understanding the fact that this does not involve simply, nor indeed largely, a lagging behind in the level of material development, but that these countries are also different, for their development has run in another direction for half a century, calls for the consideration of some sort of modern 'Marshall Plan', involving primarily intellectual cooperation and solidarity between the Western democracies and the postsocialist countries, as the result of an awareness of common development in the common interest. We should not overlook the fact that here this involves a different kind of enlargement of European institutions, for until now all the differences were contained within the same quality of relations, the same experience, values and developmental orientations. In my judgement this is especially important precisely in the key process of constituting the internal independence and self-regulation of all social subsystems, from the political, economic and social to the educational, spiritual, cultural and religious. In the spirit of the postmodern democratic society we may, through this route, most reliably form new societies with a clear and modern national identity, yet at the same time they will be a community of equal and free citizens, who in turn will be citizens of Europe and the world. This is most probably the only path which will by consensus establish a break or a discontinuity with the former society, a society that was marked by an authoritarian political system which exercised a hierarchical control and stipulation in minute detail of people's acceptable behaviour in all their roles in society and in their dealings with the political elite. Indeed the ability of all social subsystems to develop an appropriate level of autonomy and self-orientation, will provide a solid support for stability of the democratic political system, and in this way move beyond the heritage of the former authoritarian leadership, with its subordination of the universally controlled lives of its citizens to the interests of the state.
EUROPE AND THE NEW RUSSIA
There were expectations that the collapse of the Soviet Union, the dismantling of the Stalinist socio-political system and the emergence of new independent countries in this area would bring about, through some natural process, a progressive democratisation and a social and economic stabilisation along Western European lines, which would serve as the yardstick for assessing the changes. But Russia simply cannot be understood by the same yardstick and standards, or through the same patterns as (other) Central and the majority of Eastern European countries. It cannot be explained in this way, these patterns cannot lead us to comprehend the nature of the internal reform processes, the depth of conflicts, the interests, confrontations, structural discord and developmental contradiction. In so many ways this is a different country, which originates from a world of different values and which is today faced not only with the remnants of ideological differences, but also with the coexistence of numerous different, and now free, cultures and civilisations, among which that of Europe's Eastern Christianity and its influence is merely one, and by no means the only one. Russia, and development within it, are perhaps the key questions for the European future. They require a very subtle approach, including here in the Council of Europe. The Council acted wisely and responsibly when it invited Russia to become a member. Indeed the view that there could be fatal consequences for European and world peace if Russia were left outside European processes, is both important and very sober. Yet this sole answer in itself is insufficient, and points to an uncertainty. What is needed is the common strength to realise the urgent need for cooperation with modern Russia in its internal transition. Russia remains a political superpower, potentially also a great economic power, with great human and spiritual resources, without which there can be no new, secure, socially stable, successful and peaceful Europe. And in this, time becomes rather an enemy than an ally. Satisfaction merely at the fact that the borders of NATO have been shifted a few hundred kilometres towards the east, could have tragic consequences for Europe and the whole world. And also for Russia, of course.
VICIOUS CIRCLE OF SAVAGERY IN THE BALKANS
In South-Eastern Europe and in part of the Balkans the processes of Europeanisation and democratisation are stalling. I do not wish in any way to denigrate the efforts of the OSCE, the EU, NATO and in particular the direct involvement of the USA in this crisis area, especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, yet it still seems that we are dealing with a vicious circle and that we are waiting helplessly for this circle to stop of its own accord. But it will not. Yet again we need to think, without reservation or indulgence, about the causes of the war in Croatia, against Bosnia and in Kosovo. These wars were not caused or triggered by ethnic differences or by allegiance to different religions, as some would still have us believe today; for example, Serbian policy as the herald of the Orthodox Christian community is being raised to the level of defender against the purported aggression of Islamic fundamentalism. These wars were started and are being conducted by undemocratic, nationalist political elites from coexisting nations. By fanning the flames of political passions and the use of marginal groups from the social and political underground for military killings, they have torn asunder the normal, common life in multiethnic and multicultural societies with long traditions of coexistence. The consistent punishing of war criminals and decisive measures to ensure respect of human rights could represent a new step which, in harmony with new development, primarily with an economic impetus, would return to this area true peace and a 'return' of what the people there knew as times of coexistence of diversity, tolerance and cooperation.
How long the path is to this goal depends chiefly on Europe. Our continent does not have a common view of the tragic events in South-Eastern Europe, which is largely still living in the nineteenth century. There the nationalist idea is still the prime idea. It restricts people to being subjects in the service of the nation, and is master of life and death. Out of such an interpretation of human beings and their dignity, out of such an experiencing of oneself in an ethnically mixed environment there arise uncompromising regimes which allow themselves anything for as long as other regimes in the same territory or in their vicinity supposedly or actually threaten the members of their nation and the subjects of their rule. For this reason they ensure that their subjects constantly feel threatened simply for having been born to parents of this or that nationality. In the name of the nation they must forswear their integrity and dignity, and be subordinated to the tyranny of so-called higher interests. Thanks also to the conventions of the Council of Europe, at the end of this century there remains only one moral and political dictate. This is human dignity, human rights, which in the Balkan heartland, regardless of the differing civilisational values, are so cruelly violated that all of us who hold ourselves to be members of European civilisation at the turn of the millennium should be ashamed.
The fate of people in this part of the old continent has begun to revolve in a savage vicious circle. This can only be stopped by decisive intervention in the name of humanity, in the name of common civilisational norms and through a common view to the future of this, perhaps most sensitive part of Europe. Europe is indeed duty bound to do this. It is also bound to offer hope. There are many suggestions of how to extinguish the flames of crisis, perhaps too many for us to be able to select one key solution behind which the entire peace-loving world would stand and act decisively - including with force, if this is the only language understood by the nationalist military elite, which seeks by force to appropriate living space for its own people to the detriment of others (Lebensraum); an elite which speaks the political language of 'blood and earth'. Yet such a solution should not be built on stereotypes of good and bad, or on the hypothesis that there will be eternally undemocratic regimes here. We should not overlook the differences between the long-term interests of these nations and the interests and current policies of their undemocratic elites. We should avoid demeaning nations.
UNFOUNDED EUROPEAN DIVISIONS
There are old as well as new, emerging divisions in Europe, and there are clear references to them. The ideas of a European homeland, and in particular the EU as its currently most tangible form, may be pushed back to some unspecified time in the new millennium. For the countries of Central and Eastern Europe in the 'waiting room', or even waiting outside it, this is the imposing reality which for all of us together has negative rather than positive effects. By European divisions I am not thinking merely of those divisions which run along the boundaries defining membership of states in European associations. The European developmental dynamic is marked also by differences in development, differences between great and small nation states, between the stable and unstable security areas of the continent, between a Europe which is establishing common norms and one which is relativising them or acquiescing with their opponents. A similar analysis could also be applied to the various spiritual divisions and civilisational differences. The more frequent reference to divisions into Western and Eastern European Christendom, into the Christian countries as defenders against the Islamic civilisation as one of the European realities, into Semitic and anti-Semitic sections of the population, is a warning that we must prepare ourselves for life with divisions which together we can recognise as being in harmony with the desired aims of the European future, and for opposition to those things which cannot be our desired aim.
I am disturbed most of all by the emergence of a 'third Europe', if I may call it that. It is being composed of certain postsocialist countries, including some that are newly emerged, which are rejecting the European democratic political tradition and system of values, in order to preserve a somewhat modernised, but in truth old social system, and together to clash with the Western agents of 'coercion'. For this reason, too, Europe needs a new developmental impetus. In this way it would more rapidly prepare itself for life and competition in the global arena, especially now when its era of civilisational supremacy has ended. For the sake of the world and its own stability, Europe cannot allow itself to abandon or delay its association process. Changes are needed in the European Union, yet they cannot become an argument for Europe, as a result of delayed association, again falling apart and clashing along old and new lines of division. It will not be possible to hold up the globalising age.
SLOVENIA ON A NEW PATH
Honourable deputies,
I believe that your current knowledge and impression of the country of Slovenia is more complete and multifaceted. A group of deputies from the Slovenian parliament is cooperating here, and within the institutions of the Council of Europe you are conducting far-reaching communication with Slovenian people. In the spirit and awareness of the Council of Europe, Slovenia has built into the foundations of its statehood freedoms and rights, the dignity of the person in all affiliations and diversity, in order to continuously incline self-confident people to the common goal and to the common future, along with other nations and countries of the European continent. I am convinced that since independence in 1991, Slovenia has changed fundamentally. It has shaped and honed its internal and external image in line with the expectations which you invested along with the decision you took to accept us as a member. We have implemented or pledged ourselves to all the key structural reforms, and in our dealings we have relied on the Central European tradition of tolerance and multiculturalism. We have ratified the EU Association Agreement, and the appropriate procedures have been set in motion to ensure that following the negotiation processes Slovenia will indeed become a full member of the EU. We are developing productive relations with neighbouring and other countries in Europe and on other continents. Many elements of Slovenia's external and internal transformation can be seen as an expression of a consistent developmental dynamic. Perhaps slower than we would wish, or even than might be possible.
We know that every change requires a certain time. With the majority desire of internal political forces and greater effectiveness in creating developmental consensus, with the professional know-how of Slovenia's educated people, and also with the solidarity and support of other member states of the Council of Europe, the EU and specialised international organisations, it will be possible for us to work through this time and to achieve what we have pledged. In this I personally remain an optimist, and I assure you that these are also the views of the great majority of Slovenia's citizens.
Thank you for your attention.
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